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The transformation from a primarily holistic thinker to an analytical one has been 
suggested in my earlier works to be a fundamental part of the evolution of the 
fully modern Homo sapiens. This discussion will present a closer look at the mind 
of the human of the Upper Paleolithic as the impetus for an extensive, highly 
successful precursor culture. The paper will be an exercise in interpreting the 
archaeological record given a Peircean semiotic perspective and the assumption of 
the validity of the holistic/analytic dichotomy.  
 




The semiotic world of any animal species is defined by its particular array of 
cognitive and perceptual capabilities. Ethographic studies can reveal levels of 
commonality between species, but ultimately the specific Innenwelt1 will be unique 
to each species and with a degree of variability between individuals within the 
species (Haworth and Prewitt, 2010). Paleosemiosis, then, for the purposes of this 
paper describes very particular precursor populations of the Upper Paleolithic, who 
inhabited the European continent from approximately 40,000 to 15,000 years ago 
and who represent the nascent semiosis of Homo sapiens sapiens 
(anthroposemiosis). 
Delineating the Paleolithic mind is an exercise in illustrating a mind in 
transition (Haworth, 2006), moving from the relative stability and very gradual 
change of Lower and Middle Paleolithic eras over several hundred thousand years 
through the surprising alterations evident in the Upper Paleolithic to the rapid 
change that marks the modern human species. The mind of the Upper Paleolithic 
  
 




Homo sapiens is housed in an ostensibly modern human body, but with a brain that 
is apparently still undergoing some genetic transformations which underlies the still 
developing modern human cognitive process (Gazzaniga 2008, p. 7 - 37, Antinucci 
1989, p. 8).  To understand Paleosemiosis we must first develop a conception of the 
cognitive processes of the preceding populations of the Lower and Middle 
Paleolithic, the evolutionary antecedent for human intelligence.  
In countless ways others have sought to discern the evolutionary progression 
of intellectual thought, invariably by dissecting human thought processes into types 
(epitomizing the analytical mind, but more on that later) and attempting 
comparisons of these types to observed behavior in other related species. This is 
necessarily an unwieldy process, particularly when dealing with non-primate 
species, whose intellectual evolutionary journey must have taken quite different 
roads. Still, the comparisons are all we have to work with. So, volume upon volume 
exists in the academic record with each attempt finding new ways to subdivide and 
categorize human thought and somehow map those types onto other species. The 
following is a very small sampling of these classifications and the types of thought 
processes that might be included in the effort. Jamieson (2002) speaks of content 
ascription and hyperintensionality; Russon and Begun (2004) discuss symbolic 
constructions, cognitive hierarchization, generativity, metarepresentation, tool use, 
self concept, imitation, deception, logico-mathematical reasoning, and fluidity of 
thought; Bering and Povinelli (2003) talk of intentionality, imitation, goal-directed 
tasking and reinterpretation; while Antinucci (1989, p. 3 - 9) takes up sensory motor 
intelligence, classification, and seriation.  
Rarely in these categorizations have there been attempts to place types into 
hierarchies or arrays that might signal a progression through time, relying on the 
incidents of ‘like-thinking’ encountered in other species to provide the assumed 
evolutionary ascent. In essence, these analyses are actually inherently “speciesist”, 
developing typologies derived from the human repertoire without first recognizing 
  
 




the differing capabilities of other species. This form of segmentation doesn’t really 
further the search for continuity and necessarily leaves us in the dark with regard to 
the specific cognitive faculties of other animal species, which then continually leave 
us awestruck when encountering feats of memory and cognitive function that don’t 
fit within the limitations of the human cognitive realm.  We seek out the forms of 
cognition where humans excel and ignore areas of weakness. Hence, we have the 
constant source of news media materials on the oddity of animal cognitive 
achievements or even of the so-called savant achievements of the some humans 
(see for example: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/80beats/tag/animal-intelligence/, and 
http://www.newser.com/tag/31304/1/animal-inellignce.html?utm_source=ssp&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=tag,  
Walker 2009, Morton and Page 1992, Treffert and Wallace 2002, Heaton and 
Wallace 2004,  Howe 1989).  
One obvious exception to this process of segmentation without hierarchy lies 
in Piaget’s levels (Antinucci 1989, p. 11 - 17), which were derived from observations 
of human cognition as it develops in the ontogenic process.  Given the assumptions 
behind the axiom that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, Piaget’s levels could prove 
very useful in conceptualizing the evolutionary steps to human intelligence (human 
semiosis). This is exactly what was attempted in Antinucci’s edited volume Cognitive 
Structure and Development in Nonhuman Primates (1989). But, the work instead 
determined that such a recapitulation across species does not, in fact, exist. 
Antinucci concludes (p. 251) that ‘. . . the evolutionary path leading to the 
structuring of human cognitive capacities . . . seems to have taken several 
independent ‘turns’ at various steps of its long course.’ 
Another approach to a possible hierarchical development in anthroposemiosis 
was presented by Terry Prewitt (2005) when he introduced applications of Peircean 
semiotic analysis to stone tool production processes of the Middle Paleolithic as a 
support for my arguments relating to later Paleolithic cave art. Although Peirce 
(1867, 1867a) presented his ten sign types through the intersection of three triadic 
  
 




sets of categories (qualisign, sinsign, legisign; icon, index, symbol; rheme, dicent, 
argument), in his broader corpus Peirce’s emphasis was on the dynamic of sign 
process working through these categories, culminating in humans with the symbolic 
argument2. Prewitt’s discussion about the Paleolithic emergence of symboling 
merely stresses the hierarchical and simultaneous relationships among the 
categories as opposed to emphasizing the “symbolic” nature of anthroposemiosis. 
Keying on symbols in discussions of human semiosis, he observed, often misses the 
sense in which symbols serve iconic and indexical interests that in turn draw from 
natural qualities forming patterns of raw experience, which are part of 
anthroposemiosis potentially shared widely among mammals. He also devised 
several 3-dimensional graphs (adding to a large number of such illustrations in 
writings on Peirce by others) to provide a clearer demonstration of the hierarchical 
array, among which Figure 1 may be useful in furthering the present discussion.  
Prewitt goes on to demonstrate the system’s utility for understanding human 
evolutionary cognitive development with examples derived from the archaeological 
record of lithic technology, culminating with the refinements of the Upper 
Paleolithic flake-reduction processes as reflected in lithic assemblages. Prewitt’s 
discussion, referencing work offered by Kuhn (1995) that has now seen further 
expansion in the Brantingham, Kuhn, and Kerry (eds.) volume The Early Upper 
Paleolithic beyond Western Europe (2004), can give us a real glimpse into a possible 
timeline of cognitive function in the evolution of human cognition preceding the 









Figure 1.  Peircean Sign Space. Each of the ten basic sign types is represented by a 
vertical column, connecting sets of categories relating to the relationships among 
representamens, objects, and interpretants (after Prewitt 2010).   
 
In a recent brief lecture on Peirce’s system of sign classification and Paleolithic tool 
production, Prewitt (2010) expanded on his earlier argument with examples to 
illustrate the overlapping functions of the sign categories in ongoing behavioral 
process.  One element of this treatment is that extended complexity of decision-
making processes in lithic-reduction sequences during the Middle Paleolithic, and 
  
 




especially during the early Upper Paleolithic, signal propositional qualities that 
would be greatly facilitated by symbolic modeling rather than simple rhematic or 
dicent understandings on the levels of iconic or indexical sinsigns or legisigns 
(Prewitt 2010).  He states: 
 
When cultural stylistic variation of tool form appears, as it does in limited 
ways with the Acheulian tools of Homo erectus and much more systematically 
with the Mousterian tools of Neandertals, we may project simple rhematic 
symbols in that the stylistic variation amongst tools fulfilling the same or 
similar functions is conventional. . . . . Steven Kuhn’s (1995; also see Cunliffe 
1994) work on the Middle Paleolithic details some of the production 
processes in terms of linear decision-making models and other complex 
processes. If we attend closely to the processes Kuhn described, 
“Neandertals” or populations employing the Mousterian technology seem to 
have been using dicent symbols, as manifest by the complexity of the 
production process for the assemblage of multiple tool types.  In effect, each 
tool “type” in the Mousterian tool kit is a “rhematic iconic legisign” which 
could easily be referenced by an arbitrary symbol, and is also a “rhematic 
indexical legisign” referencing its function.  Presuming that form and function 
are working closely together in the tool kit, then at the least the dicent 
potential of the association seems likely (Prewitt 2010). 
 
Although it is difficult to posit the use of symbols in the Middle Paleolithic without 
evidence for the occurrence of arbitrary symbolic rhemes, Prewitt also argues that 
the minimal occurrence of arbitrary (hence, symbolic) inscriptions with cave art 
occurs alongside the emergence of great diversity in tool technologies in the Upper 
Paleolithic.  The well-known Aurignacian patterns of technology are now understood 
to be only part of a rich emergent diversity of assemblages that suggest the earliest 
  
 




symbolic differentiation of ‘cultures’ (also see Kuhn, et al. 2004). Considering the 
growing evidence of such diversity in the context of Prewitt’s semiotic arguments, it 
seems likely that the transition to habitual symbol use comes with the Upper 
Paleolithic, and further, that it does not appear full-blown but undergoes some 
substantial evolution early in that period.  Prewitt reinforces the point that the 
Peircean ‘argument’ is what distinguishes our species, not language as it is 
traditionally understood as a form of communication, since language is clearly built 
upon the logical capacities of the ‘argument’ and not visa versa.  
Peirce’s categories work well to build a common cognitive framework for 
comparative analysis of species, including evolutionary grades among the 
Hominoidea and cognitive steps within the specific evolution of the genus Homo.  
But the Peircean ‘argument’ presents a culminating logical capacity that must be 
fleshed out in order to adequately demonstrate the subtleties of the 
transformations suggested by Upper Paleolithic technologies.  For Peirce, the 
‘argument’ was a symbolic logical phenomenon (hence represented most efficiently 
through language, and seemingly co-extensive with language), while as a bio-
cognitive phenomenon the ‘argument’ was not necessarily initially grounded in 
speech-communication.  Still, in Peircean terms, the technological manifestation of 
the ‘argument’ becomes a relationship between cognitive capacities and behavioral 
habits, including habituation of the species to using verbal symbols to represent 
other cognitive routines.  But beyond concern with language, simply noting the apex 
of Peirce’s sign typology does little to illustrate the complexity of cognitive synergy 
that derives from the bio-cognitive emergence of the argument, or ‘action-fixing’ 
and ‘belief-fixing’ symbolic legisigns (see Peirce, CP2.462). For it is the human 
cognitive “result” of this level of sign construction (i.e., as we shall see, emphasis of 
linear information processing over holistic information processing) that tends to be 
the subject of the typologies derived in other studies on the evolution of human 
intelligence. My emphasis will be on an early stage in the emergence of 
  
 




anthroposemiosis when our species possessed the capacity to ‘argument’ within a 
cognitive tendency toward holistic thinking. 
 
Dichotomy of Styles 
For my purposes here, I prefer to utilize the distinctions of cognitive style (holistic 
and analytical) to elucidate the evolutionary development of hominid semiosis, as I 
am convinced this differentiation is crucial to understanding the climax evolution of 
anthroposemiosis. I presented my initial argument on the importance of the shift 
from holistic to analytical thinking in anthroposemios in an article in Semiotica in 
2006 and later, with Prewitt, provided an elaboration on the evolutionary aspects of 
the idea (Haworth and Prewitt, 2010). We stress in this other work that human 
thought always consists of aspects of both forms of cognition and that each 
individual exhibits a very variable combination of the two, ranging from high to low 
in analytic or holistic processing, as revealed in the research by Dunn and colleagues 
(1992). And, it should be noted that Kemeler-Nelson’s (1984, p.735) review of 
psychological research into these two modes determined that “holistic processing . . 
. may be frequent, fundamental, and primitive in human cognition” (as quoted in 
Beyler and Schmeck 1992, p. 710). 
My understanding of the holistic realm of thinking derived from reading works 
by and about those people who apparently represent in the contemporary human 
population the extreme high end of the holistic continuum, people with autism. The 
lives of Nadia (Selfe 1977), Temple Grandin (1995, 2005), Donna Williams (1992 and 
1994), and Steven Wiltshire (Sacks1995) exhibit a common array of attributes that 
served to define this style of cognition. The mind of a high-holistic thinker has the 
capacity to seemingly photographically reproduce remembered sights in what seems 
to be a one-to-one correspondence with the external reality. In fact, this direct 
memory exists for perception in general, so that impressions of sound, smell, touch, 
and any other sensory experience of a particular event are remembered in 
  
 




ostensibly complete fashion. Through these unusual memory skills, those autistic 
people who are not also encumbered by many of the other possible deficiencies that 
tend to accompany the autistic syndrome will exhibit the savant skills that cause 
their stories to be noticed and studied, such as the exceptional skills at artistic 
representation noted for each of the individuals mentioned above. In fact, Williams 
and Wiltshire are now professional artists (see, for example: 
http://www.donnawilliams.net/artist.0.html  and http://www.stephenwiltshire.co.uk/). The exceptional 
memories of high-holistic individuals, however, are, as it states, very distinct wholes 
that are not easily partitioned. For example, Oliver Sacks (1995, p. 255) in his 
chapter on Temple Grandin in his volume, An Anthropologist on Mars, talks of his 
telephone conversation with Dr. Grandin when she is providing directions to her 
office. He interrupts her to ask a clarifying question and when she gets back to the 
directions, she starts over again from the beginning, repeating them exactly as 
before. Also, specific aspects of one memory do not easily relate to segments of 
other memories, so that generalized concepts are built out of a collection of very 
specific past examples. For instance, Grandin (2005, p.261) notes that the word 
‘bowl’ calls to mind a large file of images of very specific bowls of past experience 
rather than a vague conglomeration of characteristics that might signify ‘bowlness’. 
All in all, a holistic form of modeling the world is a very direct one that provides 
more of a living in the moment experience of life. As Grandin (2005, p.65) puts it, 
‘Normal people see and hear schemas, not raw sensory data.’ 
In addition to defining this form of thinking, Temple Grandin, who has written 
extensively on autism, has also surmised that holistic thought must be the primary 
mode exhibited by other animal species. And, the work of Dawn Prince-Hughes 
(2004) strongly supports this conclusion. Such memory systems, seen in this light as 
a particular cognitive style, can bring many feats of the minds of other species into 
much more easily understood terms, and in this sense Grandin notes that animals 
are also savants of a sort (Grandin 2005, p. 8).  One must also realize, then, that 
  
 




many of the analyses made across species in efforts to understand human cognition 
can end up comparing apples to oranges. Cross-species observations may serve only 
to confuse the progress toward understanding human evolution, and illustrates the 
need for defining the semiosis of animals in very particular terms. We should be very 
careful in seeking commonalities in, for example, pongidsemiosis and gorillasemiosis 
with anthroposemiosis. Each signing array must be delineated, not by whether or 
not they represent a holistic mode, but to what extent elements of holistic and 
analytical processing exist in the cognitive repertoire.  
What, then, are the elements of analytical thinking we need to recognize? In 
an earlier paper presented at the Semiotic Society of America in 2007, ‘The Bubble 
Analogy: Thoughts on Cognitive Transformations in the Evolution of Human 
Language’, I offered several characteristics of analytical thinking that seem to be 
relevant to the evolutionary trend in the hominid line. Again these distinctions are 
drawn from the writings of the autistic authors mentioned above, this time 
gathering inferences from their perspectives on what they consider to be their 
cognitive deficiencies – in contrast to more ‘normal’ individuals – rather than their 
forte cognitive skills. (Although I gathered this rendering of holistic and analytic 
thought from specific individuals, it does clearly coincide with delineations of these 
modes developed out of psychological research on the more general population 
[Beyler and Schmeck 1992]).  
The analytical thinker takes the perceptions of the senses and alters the data 
in several ways, rather than storing a more directly iconic representation. The 
sensory input is broken-down, segmented, and organized into salient items of 
information. Detail of recall is reduced, but certain elements of the environment are 
considered more worthy of note, as nodes of relevant data. This is an essential 
element in the creation of symbolic rhemes, arbitrary signs that cue memory to a 
constellation of stored perceptions in the form of indexical sinsigns and legisigns. 
This segmentation allows, then, a second tier of data manipulation—a process of 
  
 




interconnecting nodes within memory, which results in the construction of 
generalized concepts and logical types3. These concepts are then abstracted in a 
codified manner, what I consider to be a kind of mental shorthand. This process of 
abstraction is the ideation behind the stick-figure drawings of children and the 
stylized artwork of human culture (Haworth 2006). Unlike high-holistic savant 
artists, people in general tend to draw what we know, not what we see (Selfe 1977, 
p. 98). I use the word ‘shorthand’ here in referencing these abstractions to highlight 
very specifically the efficiency that this mode of thought must engender. Cognitive 
typologies, then, become the natural method used by the analytic thinkers of 
academia to segment the cognitive process in the effort to understand it. 
Now returning to comparison with non-human species, the primary point I set 
up with the bubble analogy is that these aspects of analytical thinking exist, though 
to a lesser degree, for most species. The relational ideas about various abstracted 
elements in one’s surroundings provides the creative, inventive, and general 
problem-solving behaviors we find in most species in one form or another, but 
typically operating only on the iconic and indexical level. I have suggested that the 
memory of the holistic thinker might be illustrated as a series of bubbles, wherein 
the entire set of perceptual data for individual events is represented in full-color 
tones, as the detail of recall is extensive and relatively complete. Within these 
bubbles certain elements can be seen as relational to other elements, and indicated 
by highlighted points connected by lines and representing aspects of analytical 
cognition within the holistic gestalt experience. But, in non-human semiosis those 
relations remain for the most part attached to the single experience essentially 
through iconic or indexical sinsigns and legisigns. This limitation on analytic thinking 
is similar to Merlin Donald’s ideas of ‘episodic memory’ in his model for the 
development of human consciousness (1991, p. 149-153).  
The bubble analogy can then serve to show that the enlargement of the 
neocortex in primate evolution could represent a rather simple idea that the bubble 
  
 




enlarges to allow memory of events to encompass larger and larger amounts of time 
or space. As one possible example of the limitations of a species bubble, consider 
the problem-solving experiments with chickens noted in Kohler’s The Mentality of 
Apes (1925, p. 12 – 16). The subject hens were unable to discern the path to food 
placed behind an L-shaped mesh barrier until chance movement led them to the 
edge of the barrier. Or, consider the situation presented in Rivas and Burghardt’s 
article on anthropomorphism (2002, p.15) where mice released into a field could 
easily return to their forested habitat 20 meters away, but were unable to orient 
toward the forest when released 30 meters distant. However, as the bubble 
enlarges so do the attendant analytical capabilities, allowing for more 
interconnection between elements within the bubble, though still with the 
limitation of its confines. This simple enlargement argument can serve to explain the 
developments represented by the transformation of lithic technology considered in 
Prewitt’s work. And, this reasoning makes the standard method of searching out 
characteristics of analytical thinking in others and then making a black and white—it 
exists or not—judgment to be a spurious method that can only lead us in circles. 
Anthroposemios does not hold the patent on analytic thinking (also noted by Langer 
1989, p. 230). Instead, where the difference lies is in a matter of degree.  And what 
makes the difference so dramatic is that it also entails a platform shift in cognition. 
Humans are – for the most part – analytic thinkers with a limited holistic capacity, 
while the norm for other species has always been, and still is, to be holistic thinkers 
with some analytic capacity.  
 
Paleosemiosis 
When discussing the transformation to a cognitive style that is primarily analytic, I 
believe we are looking at the unique time frame in the hominid record that was the 
Upper Paleolithic. Up to this point, the achievements of the hominid line might 
simply result from the brain enlargement that is a general trend in primate 
  
 




evolution. Yet, through the physiological demands of upright posture, brain 
enlargement was forced to proceed on a different ontogenic schedule in later 
hominids than for any other primate species (Haworth and Prewitt, 2010; Kelley 
2004, p. 285).  In other words, contrary to most suppositions on the evolution of 
cognition, intellectual power was not the driving force behind the early stages of 
hominid brain growth, but is at most a steering mechanism on changes already 
underway through other simpler biological pressures. 
However, at the advent of the Upper Paleolithic the archaeological data 
indicate that something new has been added.  The Upper Paleolithic record attests 
to cognitive developments far beyond anything produced by earlier populations, 
while not yet exhibiting all the traits that appear in the Mesolithic, dating from 
about 12,000 years ago, through the Neolithic, from around 8,000 years ago, and 
into historic times (Mellars 1994). The Upper Paleolithic represents a time of 
invention. Mellars’ title for his chapter on the Upper Paleolithic in Cunliffe’s volume 
Prehistory of Europe (1994, p. 42 - 78) declares it revolutionary. Of stone tool 
technology Mellars (1994, p. 46) notes a ‘proliferation’ of blade forms and that 
‘significant shifts in stone tool production can be seen in the much greater 
dynamism and innovation shown by Upper Paleolithic communities in creating a 
much wider and more diverse range of tool forms than those produced during 
earlier periods.’ He goes on to note that an even greater level of creativity and 
innovation is evident in bone and antler tool technologies (p. 51). The Upper 
Paleolithic aesthetic creativity also stems from the very earliest communities with a 
proliferation of carvings and decorative ornamentation, in addition to the famous 
cave paintings of southern France and northern Spain (Mellars, 1994, p. 51 – 52). 
Societal transformations are an equally important part of the Upper Paleolithic 
revolution, with the first indications of large settlement activity, group stylistic and 
technical variations, and emergent trading and exchange networks (Mellars, 1994, p. 
59 – 67). 
  
 




 In keeping with the archaeological evidence, Gazzaniga (2008, p. 16) notes 
genetics research that indicates genes related to the development of the human 
brain have undergone mutation at least twice in recent times, relatively speaking3. I 
surmise that the change represented by one of these mutations involved alterations 
in neural networking that enhanced the extant analytical aspects of the left 
hemisphere of the neocortex, as noted in Gazzaniga (2008, p. 27 – 32). But, the 
plasticity of brain operations that allows functional areas to expand can affect 
strength in other areas.  Comparative neurological research indicates the various 
configurations that allow for enhanced hearing or sight or smell, for example, are 
related to the size of those processing areas within the brain (Gazzaniga, 2008, p. 22 
– 25).  It seems the trade off for Paleolithic populations, as analytic cognition 
expanded, was that the holistic experience was diminished. (See Hopkins, Pilcher, 
and Cantalupo 2003 in Primate Psychology for a thorough discussion of the 
comparative structural similarities in the brain between human and other primates.) 
Returning to the bubble metaphor then, the interconnecting nodes increase to 
a point where the remaining perceptual data are represented only as half-tones.  
The clear delineation of the bubble’s confines begins to breakdown, defined, say, by 
a dotted line instead of a definite solid one. The mind illustrated by this bubble of 
half-tones and nodes is a mind relatively balanced between analytic and holistic 
thought. Note Paul Mellar’s enthusiastic comment on the aesthetic creativity of the 
Upper Paleolithic (1994, p. 67) 
 
. . .  the art stands in many ways as the most impressive and enduring 
testimony to the creativity of Upper Paleolithic culture – not only in terms of 
the sheer skill and aesthetic flair of the artists themselves, but also in their 
capacity to convey highly sophisticated, symbolic messages in a remarkable 
variety of forms. 
  
 




I should note that Mellar’s use of the term ‘symbolic’ here is probably somewhat at 
variance with what we can easily demonstrate, though essentially correct.  
Elsewhere, Prewitt and I have (2010) set out a framework for the elaboration 
of communication systems for the Upper Paleolithic. In that model we differentiate 
between what we call Language I, a period when the species possessed the capacity 
for the Peircean argument, but did not habitually model the world with symbols, 
and the elaborated symbolic communication system like our own that we called 
Language II. In a similar arguments several authors have suggested that music may 
be very important in developing our sequential (analytical) modes of thinking (Patel 
2008, Mithen 2006, Wray 2000), stressing the connection between music and 
language as structures unfolding in time. We stress the parallel balance of analytic 
and holistic qualities between musical processes and the production in time of the 
metaphorical realism (iconic representation) of the cave paintings. It makes sense 
that alongside transformation of visual perception to iconic representations that 
early auditory experiences might have been similarly manipulated in vocalizations. 
The song as imitation of natural sounds in the environment offers a ready medium 
for a transition to vocal symbolism, Such arguments are consistent with long held 
ideas of onomatopoeia as an aspect of the origins of language. In all these 
arguments, then, in essence the Upper Paleolithic instigates human cultural 
traditions as it codifies direct experience of the world into symbolic understanding. 
It is interesting to note that a recent work surveying Upper Paleolithic societies 
of Eastern Europe, (Kuhn, Brantingham, and Kerry 2004, p. 242-248) concluded that 
the cultural markers so well understood by early research in Western Europe do not 
show a geographic expansion eastward through time as had been previously 
expected. Instead, what was found were culturally distinct areas throughout Europe.  
I consider this to be in keeping with the scenario of the transitional cognitive shift. 
Rather than transmitting an established cultural tradition over an extended space, 
what is shifting location are the individuals within the population. These are 
  
 




populations of developing analytic capability, traveling and expanding their territory.  
And within each new settlement cultural invention takes place.  There are 
commonalities in these new traditions, which indicate like-thinkers, as they 
represent the same developing level of analytical capacity (like the cultural 
universals for modern humans that represent our common cognitive traits). 
The Upper Paleolithic is an exceptional period in human prehistory, as it 
establishes the bases for all the world cultural traditions to follow. The excitement 
of invention and new ideas is and has always been a basic element of human 
populations and gets its true beginning in the Upper Paleolithic, so that within a 
scant 30 thousand years, the entire planet is altered completely. Earlier incarnations 
of the hominid line (Homo erectus in its diverse forms, for example) existed for 
hundreds of thousands of years in relatively stable, unchanging cultures. Even Homo 
sapiens neanderthalensis did not show substantial behavioral evolution over tens of 
thousands of years. But, fully modern human populations, by definition, do not sit 
still.  
The populations of the Upper Paleolithic were groups representing a huge 
diversity of cognitive types exhibiting talents in a wide array. Some behavior 
expressed out of these talents lent a greater level of success for some populations. 
Biocultural selection assured that particular talents became more prevalent in time 
and gene flow gradually expanded these capacities in space. This exant biocultural 
process was, no doubt enhanced by the pressures of the environmental 
transformations brought about by the warming of the climate at the end of 
glaciation periods of the Pleistocene (Mellars 1994, p. 75). This stimulus for change 
once again altered brain physiology and furthers the transformation begun in the 
early Upper Paleolithic. What I am suggesting, in plain terms, is that it is at the close 
of the Upper Paleolithic that analytical thought becomes established as the 
dominant cognitive style for the species, rather than being in balance with the 
holistic as before. 
  
 






In terms of the ‘human’ bubble, analytical dominance is illustrated by the nodes of 
interrelated elements of perception interconnecting across bubble boundaries. For 
the first time connections from event to event are analyzed in a linear fashion, as a 
time line from past to future. This is the sequential aspect of analytical thought 
(Bering and Povinelli 2003, p. 224) that allows for planning and true evaluation of 
past efforts, the search for pattern and prediction of the future (Gazzaniga 2008, p. 
367-268), time consciousness, and the awareness of results of changes through 
time. It allows for generating stories of our individual histories, our personal 
narrative, and the invention of narrative in general. At this point the human brain 
becomes involved with inventing cause and effect plots for personal experience and 
events in the external world (Bering and Povinelli 2003, p. 210, 228-9), and as a 
result, discerning annual variations in the environment and food sources leading to 
the first efforts at manipulation of those sources – plant and animal domestication. 
And, in my estimation this also marks the time of myth-making, the genesis of 
scientific thought, and the development of ruled-based behavior, such as the 
grammatical communication system that is Language II (Haworth and Prewitt, 2010). 
All of these markers manifest the underlying logical capacity Peirce called the 
‘argument’, the ultimate cognitive integration of analytical thought with abstracted 
traces of holistic experience. 
In terms of the archaeological record, the Mesolithic era (12,000 – 8,000 
B.C.E.) seems to document this next level of transformation. The Mesolithic 
represents yet another progression in lithic tool technology with the appearance of 
microlith industries. The small blades were apparently hafted onto wood or bone 
elements to from a ‘wide-range of multi-component tools’ (Mithen 1994, p. 96). In 
addition to a varied stone tool assemblage, Mesolithic sites contain diverse tool 
forms of wood, bone, and antler, including points, barbed harpoons, fishhooks, 
  
 




woven wicker traps, and bark containers. Many of the larger pieces are adorned 
with geometric designs and sculptural forms are highly stylized. These sites also 
provide evidence for structures and settlement sites. And the first cemeteries and 
burials with grave goods date from the late Mesolithic (Mithen 1994, p. 79 – 135). 
The range of variability in the Mesolithic leads Mithen to characterize the period as 
being a finale to the hunter-gather era, a prelude to the economic systems of later 
prehistory, as well as providing an identity unique to its time and to proclaim it ‘one 
of the most critical periods of transformation in European prehistory’ (1994, p. 133 - 
135). 
With this continued transformation in physiology, once again the holistic mind 
is diminished and those individuals within the population capable of the artistic 
achievements of the Upper Paleolithic ostensibly disappear (Mellars 1994, p. 78; 
Haworth 2007), leaving the predominant art forms for the Mesolithic and beyond to 
be the stylistic abstractions of human cultures still prevalent today (Mithen 1994, p. 
127 - 132; Haworth 2007). Unlike the startling and relatively abrupt changes noted 
in the archaeological record for the advent of the Upper Paleolithic, the timeline for 
the transition to the Mesolithic and on into the Neolithic have ‘blurred’ and ‘fuzzy’ 
edges (Mithen 1994, p. 79). The rock art of the Spanish Levant presents a unique 
illustration of this continued progression. Some walls show the elegant animal 
figures of past traditions along with the stylized depictions of human activity and 
story that are common to contemporary populations. Often times the human figures 
are actually incised over the animal figures (Beltrán 1982). This art, and the 
archaeological record in general, are indicative of a population whose brain 
physiology is still undergoing transformation. The end result by the advent of the 









Each time I present a version of this holistic to analytic scenario for human cognitive 
evolution, I stress the point that there still remains a huge diversity of cognitive 
types throughout humanity with talents expressed in great variety.  Although 
analytic thought introduced new perspectives on the world, the true uniqueness of 
human creativity lies in the power of the combination of styles within the population 
and within the individual. As I mentioned in my original publication on this subject, 
Dunn, et al. (1992) researched the extent to which individuals tended toward the 
low or high end of the continua of both analytical and holistic modes of cognition. 
Regardless of the general dominance of the analytic style for most, there still 
remains a vibrant interaction between the two styles in each of us, allowing for the 
tremendous diversity of human talents. Gazzaniga’s studies on the comparative 
functions of the left and right hemispheres presents the hypothesis (2008, p. 296): 
 
. . . the left-hemisphere interpreter constructs theories to assimilate perceived 
information into a comprehensible whole. . . . In doing so, however, the 
process of elaborating (story making) has a deleterious effect on the accuracy 
of perceptual recognition, as it does with verbal and visual material. Accuracy 
remains high in the right hemisphere, however, because it does not engage in 
these interpretive processes. The advantage of having such a dual system is 
obvious. The right hemisphere maintains an accurate record of events, leaving 
the left hemisphere free to elaborate and make inferences about the material 
presented. In an intact brain, the two systems complement each other, 
allowing elaborative processing without sacrificing veracity.  
 
But, there is great variability in the ways in which this combination of function may 
present in the individual. We are not all mathematicians, or musicians, or academics. 
And let’s not forget that our so-called success as a species may also be the cause our 
ultimate demise, as our ability to connect between events seems limited after all. 
  
 




We may plan over annual cycles, but we have obviously not yet mastered concern 
beyond a generational limit.  Also, our analytical selves seem to recognize a loss, if 
only subconsciously, that is manifest in the spiritual ways we invent, though no one 
agrees as to what the something lost is, specifically. I suggest it may be the ability to 
take in what exists around us as it is and appreciate it without condensing it into 
preconceived concepts. This aspect of our predecessor past still exists within us, 
though for most of us not as a dominant force, but still there, enough to conflict 
within us and within groups, cultures, and nations. 
One of the failures of the analytic process is a tendency to assume like 
cognitive systems in others, whether we are considering our neighbors or our 
neighbors’ dogs. Our personal modeling system does not necessarily apply across 
individuals and species. It is part of the pattern recognition tactic that serves us well 
in many pragmatic ways (Gazzaniga 2008, p. 368) that sends us off the mark in this 
manner. We take limited data and apparent similar end results and assume the 
internal processes that underlie them, resulting in the anthropomorphism of 
comparative studies (Rivas and Burghardt 2002), not to mention just basic human 
misunderstandings in our daily lives. As noted by Bering and Povenelli (2003, p. 209) 
 
. . .  the very mind (the human one) that seeks to analyze objectively the 
behavior of other species in order to determine the nature of their cognitive 
systems is already wired to interpret their behavior from a human 
standpoint—regardless of the objective reality. Put another way, here is one 
thing of which we can be sure: the human mind is extremely adept at seeing 
the world through its own lens . . . . 
 
I go one step further to point out that we see through our own personal lens and 
that affects our interpretation of all others. The commonalities that we share with 
other species through common aspects of holistic cognition and limited analytic 
  
 




capacities feed our tendency to over-generalize. And thus, even possessing the 
derived cognitive platform that enables anthroposemiosis, vigilant awareness of 




1 Innenwelt in this paper is from the concept as developed by John Deely in his Four 
Ages of Understanding (2001). 
2 A very detailed technical assessment of this aspect of Peirce’s writings can be 
found in chapters three and four of Peirce and Triadomania: A Walk in the Semiotic 
Wildersess (Spinks, 1991, 51-132).   
3 Kenneth Pike (1967) differentiated feature, manifestation, and distribution modes 
in his exposition of what he called emic units in culture.  The feature mode 
represents descriptive attributes relating to the unit, while the manifestation mode 
represents the sense in which the unit forms a logical type.  Pike’s notion of the 
feature mode involved a selection of key attributes similar to that described here for 
the perceptual base of analytic thinking, while the manifestation mode fits well with 
the abstracted sign posited here as the foundation of fully human anthroposemiosis. 
The distribution mode for Pike represented the associations of context that different 
manifestations sometimes obtain as correlations of sub-patterns and situation in the 
generation and interpretation of the logical types. 
4 The two dates mentioned in Gazzaniga (2008, p. 16) for gene mutation are too 
recent (37,000 and 5,800 years ago) to directly jibe with the archaeological record. 
Possibly, there is some sort of lag between when individuals appear with the 
mutation and begin to develop the cultural artifacts that appear in the record and 
the point at which the mutation is permanently established in sufficient numbers to 
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